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SLOUCHING	  TOWARD	  BABEL:	  	  
OKLAHOMA’S	  FIRST	  MARKETABLE	  PRODUCT	  PROBLEM	  
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most divisive issues taking hold in the oil and gas industry is the debate 
concerning the deductibility of post-production costs from royalty payments.1 From this 
controversy flows a minefield of judicial interpretations among the major oil and gas-
bearing states.2 On one side of the spectrum is the established and majority “at the well” 
approach, while on the other is the minority “first marketable product” approach.3 Gen-
erally, states that follow the at the well approach allow deduction of post-production 
costs (costs incurred after severance of gas from the well) in the calculation of royalty 
payments.4 For states following the first marketable product approach, there is no clearly 
defined rule for its application across jurisdictions.5 More often than not, however, the 
likelihood that a lessee will incur the bulk of post-production costs, without deduction of 
such costs in royalty calculations, is considerable in these states.6 Over the course of sev-
eral judicial opinions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has thrown its hat into the first mar-
ketable product bloc.7 
This article argues that Oklahoma’s adoption of the first marketable product doc-
trine is a poor alternative to the more reasonable and established at the well approach, 
and based on unwieldy Oklahoma court decisions as well as recent decisions in other 
gas-bearing jurisdictions, the state should abandon it and adopt the at the well approach. 
Part II of this article focuses on the basic fundamentals of royalty clauses and provides 
                                                	   1.	  	   Scott	  Lansdown,	  The	  Marketable	  Condition	  Rule,	  44	  S.	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  667,	  668-­‐69	  (2003)	  (propound-­‐ing	  that	  the	  deductibility	  of	  post-­‐production	  costs	  is	  a	  widely	  litigated	  issue	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry).	  	   2.	  	   David	  E.	  Pierce,	  Royalty	  Jurisprudence:	  A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  States,	  49	  WASHBURN	  L.J.	  347,	  348	  (2010)	  (de-­‐scribing	   the	  existence	  of	   the	   two	  major	   judicial	  views	   in	  controversy	  and	  discussing	   the	   individuals	  or	  groups	  that	  frequently	  align	  themselves	  with	  one	  view	  or	  the	  other	  based	  on	  their	  position	  and	  interest	  in	  the	  litigation);	  see	  generally	  Russell	  L.	  Schetroma,	  General	  Reflections	  upon	  the	  Evolving	  Eastern	  Oil	  and	  
Gas	  Lease,	  30	  ENERGY	  &	  MIN.	  L.	  INST.	  448,	  460-­‐61	  (2009)	  (discussing	  that	  deductibility	  of	  post-­‐production	  costs	  is	  highly	  litigated	  and	  that	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  such	  litigation	  relates	  to	  disparate	  judicial	  interpreta-­‐tions).	  	  	   3.	  	   Byron	  C.	  Keeling,	  A	  New	  Era	  in	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Royalty	  Accounting,	  2	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  FIN.	  J.	  1-­‐2,	  available	  at	  http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/voulme-­‐2/issue-­‐7/features/a-­‐new-­‐era-­‐in-­‐oil-­‐and-­‐gas-­‐royalty-­‐accounting.html.	  	   4.	  	   8-­‐A	  HOWARD	  R.	  WILLIAMS	  &	  CHARLES	  J.	  MEYERS,	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LAW	  72	  (Matthew	  Bender	  &	  Co.	  ed.,	  Lex-­‐isNexis	  2012).	  	  	   5.	  	   Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3.	  	  	   6.	  	   See	  generally	  Wellman	  v.	  Energy	  Res.,	   Inc.,	  557	  S.E.2d	  254,	  265	  (W.	  Va.	  2006)	  (determining	  that	  the	   implied	   covenant	   to	  market	   demands	   that	   lessees	   bear	   all	   post-­‐production	   expenses	   necessary	   to	  achieve	  a	  marketable	  product);	  Rogers	  v.	  Westerman	  Farm	  Co.,	  29	  P.3d	  887,	  905-­‐06	  (Colo.	  2001)	  (hold-­‐ing	   that	   lessee	   must	   achieve	   a	   marketable	   product	   and	   as	   such	   incurs,	   in	   addition	   to	   other	   post-­‐production	  costs,	  all	  transportation	  costs	  necessary	  to	  satisfy	  this	  requirement).	  	   7.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203	  (Okla.	  1998);	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	  
rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259	  (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880	  (Okla.	  1992).	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useful background that enables a better understanding of the overarching issue. Part III 
largely examines the two conflicting approaches as well as provides brief synopses of 
states that have adopted the first marketable product approach. The discussion in Part IV 
covers Oklahoma’s variation of the approach and focuses on the court cases that ulti-
mately led to its adoption in the state. Part V parses through the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa’s rulings in an attempt to synthesize a singular definition of the first marketable 
product doctrine and addresses the many problems that exist with its application and use 
in the state. In Part VI, the discussion looks at the increasingly growing trend away from 
the first marketable product approach and expands on how these trends should prompt 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to modify its approach. Part VII concludes by reiterating 
the need for Oklahoma to make a concerted effort to change its stance on the deduction 
of post-production costs. 
II. FUNDAMENTALS 
As this discussion focuses on the deduction of post-production costs in the calcula-
tion of royalty payments, it is important to mention a few distinctions between the differ-
ent types of royalty clauses.8 Generally, it is understood that a royalty is “a share of [or 
interest in] production, free of expenses of production.”9 Put simply, the royalty holder is 
free from any costs that might occur in the course of bringing about and completing pro-
duction.10 However, interpretations vary significantly with respect to the exact point at 
which production ceases and the sharing of costs begins, if such cost sharing is deemed 
necessary at all.11 
Oil and gas differ physically in that oil can be stored or contained at sites separate 
from the well, whereas it is not economically feasible to store natural gas in this man-
ner.12 Consequently, in most leases, there is a distinction between royalty clauses con-
cerning oil and those concerning gas.13 Oil royalty clauses are commonly “in-kind,” 
meaning the royalty holder is entitled to his share in the form of oil itself.14 However, 
royalty owners frequently receive cash payment instead of oil.15 Given the economic in-
feasibility of paying out royalties for gas in-kind, parties usually construct clauses to 
provide payment based on “market value” or “proceeds.”16 It is generally understood that 
there are two methods for calculating these payments: the “comparable sales method” 
and the “work-back method.”17 For market value leases, the preferred method is compa-
rable sales, in which “lessee[s] determine[] the market value of . . . oil or gas production 
                                                	   8.	  	   8-­‐R	  HOWARD	  R.	  WILLIAMS	  &	  CHARLES	  J.	  MEYERS,	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LAW	  64	  (Matthew	  Bender	  &	  Co.	  ed.,	  Lex-­‐isNexis	  2012).	  	   9.	  	   Id.	  	  	   10.	  	   Id.	  	  	   11.	  	   See	  Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3;	  see	  also	  Rogers	  v.	  Westerman	  Farm	  Co.,	  29	  P.3d	  887	  (Colo.	  2001);	  Mit-­‐telstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203	  (Okla.	  1998);	  Sternberger	  v.	  Marathon	  Oil	  Co.,	  894	  P.2d	  788	  (Kan.	  1995).	  	   12.	  	   JOHN	  S.	  LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  CASES	  AND	  MATERIALS	  ON	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LAW	  433	  (5th	  ed.	  2008).	  	   13.	  	   Id.	  	  	   14.	  	   See	  3-­‐6	  HOWARD	  R.	  WILLIAMS	  &	  CHARLES	  J.	  MEYERS,	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LAW	  §	  659	  (Matthew	  Bender	  &	  Co.	  ed.,	  LexisNexis	  2012).	  	   15.	  	   Id.	  	   16.	  	   Id.;	  see	  also	  LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12.	  	  	   17.	  	   Byron	  C.	  Keeling	  &	  Karolyn	  King	  Gillespie,	  The	  First	  Marketable	  Product	  Doctrine:	  Just	  What	  is	  the	  
“Product”?,	  37	  ST.	  MARY’S	  L.J.	  1,	  31-­‐32	  (2005).	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at the wellhead by averaging the prices that the lessee and other producers are receiv-
ing . . . comparabl[y] . . . .”18 However, more often than not, the comparable sales meth-
od is not a viable option because there are frequently no comparable sales available to 
evaluate, and use of the work-back method is generally permitted.19 For proceeds leases, 
lessees calculate payment based on the price of the produced gas at the wellhead, typical-
ly using the work-back method, if post-production costs are incurred.20 Work-back in-
volves the adjustment of payments based on the post-production costs a lessee expends 
in bringing the gas to market.21 The amount is calculated proportionally to the interest of 
the royalty holder.22 It is worth mentioning, however, that the application of work-back 
in deduction situations varies by jurisdiction depending upon the jurisdiction’s view on 
the deductibility of post-production costs.23 For the purposes of this article, the distinc-
tion between “market value” and “proceeds” is largely unimportant, as work-back—
which frequently is the more used calculation method—generally operates the same for 
both when determining payments.24 
III. FROM THE PRODUCER’S PURSE OR THE INTEREST HOLDER’S PURSE: 
THE TWO VIEWS ON DEDUCTIBILITY 
A. “At the Well” 
Historically, and until a string of court decisions in a handful of states over the last 
few decades, the at the well approach has been the predominant and established means 
for calculating royalty payments.25 This approach interprets at the well and similar leases 
as allowing for deduction of costs incurred post-production from royalty payments.26 
This is because in these kinds of leases, which are fairly common, the lessee determines 
payment based on the price of the produced gas at the wellhead.27 If the gas is simply 
sold at the wellhead and the lessee incurs no post-production costs, then the lessee does 
not make deductions, and instead pays the royalty holder his proportion of that sale.28 
Processes and expenses occurring after this point (post-extraction), however, typically 
add to the value of the product and are therefore deducted proportionately.29 These post-
production costs generally are incurred in the furtherance of creating a sellable or more 
sellable product and may include “transportation, gathering, processing, treating, and 
marketing expenses.”30 Costs prior to extraction are considered production costs and de-
                                                	   18.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	   19.	  	   Id.	  at	  33	  n.129.	  	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  33-­‐34.	  	  	   21.	  	   8-­‐W	  HOWARD	  R.	  WILLIAMS	  &	  CHARLES	  J.	  MEYERS,	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LAW	  31	  (Matthew	  Bender	  &	  Co.	  ed.,	  Lex-­‐isNexis	  2012).	  	   22.	  	   Id.	  	   23.	  	   Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  35-­‐37.	  	  	   24.	  	   Id.	  at	  33-­‐35.	  	  	   25.	  	   Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  671.	  	  	   26.	  	   Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1.	  	  	   27.	  	   Id.	  	  	   28.	  	   WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  4.	  	   29.	  	   See	  generally	  Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1	  (expressing	  that	  the	  value	  of	  gas	  increases	  with	  the	  addi-­‐tion	  of	  post-­‐extraction	  processes	  and	  therefore	  royalty	  interest	  holders	  generally	  disfavor	  the	  at	  the	  well	  approach).	  	  	   30.	  	   Id.	  
3
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ductions from royalty payments for these expenses are not permitted.31 With the at the 
well approach, lessees frequently use the work-back method for royalty payment deduc-
tions or adjustments.32 
Naturally, energy companies and lessees attempting to bring the product to market 
prefer this deduction framework, which allows a more evenhanded distribution of costs, 
and royalty interest holders disfavor it.33 Although giving the appearance of benefitting 
the producing party to the detriment of the royalty holders, the expectation that producers 
should solely shoulder the bulk of post-production costs seems no more reasonable.34 
Because a royalty is, by definition, “a share of production, free of expenses of produc-
tion,”35 it reasonably follows that royalty holders should not be free from sharing costs 
incurred post-production.36 Consequently, the use of this method provides a practical 
way for lessees to adjust payments based on expenses that go beyond the point at which 
gas is extracted from the wellhead.37 Texas, Louisiana, and several other states follow 
this interpretation and continue to use the at the well approach, allowing for a work-back 
method in the calculation and deduction of royalty payments.38 
B. First Marketable Product Doctrine 
Unlike the at the well approach, which has a general consistency in its definition 
across jurisdictions, the first marketable product doctrine is the subject of many interpre-
tations, and there is no single cross-jurisdictional definition or approach for the princi-
ple.39 Very generically, the first marketable product doctrine can be expressed as “[a] ju-
dicial rule of royalty clause interpretation . . . that where a lease is silent as to allocation 
of costs, the implied covenant to market obligates the lessee to incur costs necessary to 
render the gas marketable.”40 Part of the jurisdictional fragmentation arises from two 
separate, though overlapping, viewpoints that courts often use for justifying the ap-
proach.41 Professors Kuntz and Merrill of the University of Oklahoma provide helpful 
commentary in explaining these justifications.42 Their respective contributions are dis-
cussed in turn below. 
Professor Kuntz adopts an express language view, arguing that “absent clarifying 
                                                	   31.	  	   WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  §	  645.1.	  	  	  	   32.	  	   Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1.	  	  	  	   33.	  	   See	  generally	  Pierce,	  supra	  note	  2	  (discussing	  that	   lessees	  involved	  in	   litigation	  often	  attempt	  to	  convince	  courts	  to	  follow	  the	  Texas	  at	  the	  well	  view,	  while	  lessors	  generally	  attempt	  to	  argue	  use	  of	  the	  Colorado	  first	  marketable	  product	  view).	  	  	  	   34.	  	  	  See	   generally	   David	   E.	   Pierce,	  Developments	   in	   Nonregulatory	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Law:	   The	   Continuing	  
Search	  for	  Analytical	  Foundations,	  47	  INST.	  ON	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  L.	  &	  TAXATION	  §	  1.07[4][c]	  (1996)	  (arguing	  that	  lessees	  should	  not	  have	  to	  share	  with	  lessors	  the	  rewards	  gained	  from	  post-­‐production	  endeavors	  free	  of	  cost).	  	  	   35.	  	   WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  8	  (emphasis	  added).	  	   36.	  	   See	  generally	  Martin	  v.	  Glass,	  571	  F.	  Supp.	  1406,	  1410	  (N.D.	  Tex.	  1983)	  (“[A]	  royalty	  is	  an	  expense-­‐free	  interest,	  paid	  out	  of	  production	  .	  .	  .	  It	  is	  free	  of	  all	  costs	  of	  development	  and	  production	  .	  .	  .	  but	  may	  share	  in	  any	  costs	  incurred	  subsequent	  to	  production.”).	  	  	   37.	  	   Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  35-­‐37.	  	   38.	  	   Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1.	  	   39.	  	   Id.	  at	  1-­‐2.	  	  	   40.	  	   8-­‐M	  HOWARD	  R.	  WILLIAMS	  &	  CHARLES	  J.	  MEYERS,	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LAW	  12	  (Matthew	  Bender	  &	  Co.	  ed.,	  Lex-­‐isNexis	  2012).	  	   41.	  	   LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  475.	  	   42.	  	   Id.	  
4
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lease language, the default rule for royalty valuation should depend upon when oil and 
gas is deemed to be produced under the lease.”43 He further contends that “the acts which 
constitute production have not ceased until a marketable product has been obtained.”44 In 
other words, the obligations of a lessee extend as far as necessary to achieve a marketa-
ble product and costs associated with such necessities are not deductible.45 Under the 
most common types of gas royalty provisions, Professor Kuntz argues that one should 
interpret a lessee’s production obligations within the fundamental meaning of such 
clauses.46 
Conversely, Professor Merrill contends that the first marketable product approach 
more appropriately stems from the implied covenant to market.47 He argues that lessees 
inherently have a duty to market the gas and must therefore engage in the steps necessary 
to render it ready for sale.48 Based on this rationale, he concludes that “[n]o part of the 
costs of marketing or of preparation for sale is chargeable to the lessor [royalty interest 
holder].”49 Further, it is worth mentioning that, “[a]lthough courts adopting the marketa-
ble-product rule have often cited Professor Kuntz, their opinions are often closer to . . . 
the view of Professor Merrill.”50 The courts often push Professor Merrill’s view a step 
further by lessening the amount of deference given to the actual royalty language.51 To 
an extent, the generic definition of the first marketable product doctrine given above ap-
pears to be in line with court applications of the approach and therefore may help with 
parsing together the many variations scattered throughout various jurisdictions.52 The 
discussion below will demonstrate, however, that it is difficult to weave together a single 
definition that encompasses the variations in the doctrine.53 
C. Jurisdictional Synopses of the First Marketable Product Doctrine 
 The major players advancing the first marketable product approach are Colorado, 
Kansas, West Virginia, and Oklahoma, with each taking a different spin on its applica-
tion.54 For background purposes, only a brief discussion of the first three states’ interpre-
tations is provided, as the focus of this article is specifically on Oklahoma’s implementa-
tion of the approach. It is perhaps best then to start with one of the more radical of the 
lot: Colorado.55 
                                                	   43.	  	   Id.;	  3-­‐40	  KUNTZ,	  LAW	  OF	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  §	  40.5(b)	  (2012).	  	   44.	  	   LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  475;	  KUNTZ,	  supra	  note	  43,	  §	  40.5(b).	  	   45.	  	   See	  LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  475.	  	  	   46.	  	   KUNTZ,	  supra	  note	  43.	  	   47.	  	   LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  475.	  	   48.	  	   Id.;	  MAURICE	  H.	  MERRILL,	  THE	  LAW	  RELATING	  TO	  COVENANTS	  IMPLIED	  IN	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LEASES	  15,	  214-­‐215	  (2d	  ed.	  1940).	  	  	   49.	  	   LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  475;	  MERRILL,	  supra	  note	  48.	  	   50.	  	   LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  475.	  	  	   51.	  	   Id.	  	  	   52.	  	   See,	   e.g.,	   Wellman	   v.	   Energy	   Resources,	   Inc.,	   557	   S.E.2d	   254,	   264-­‐65	   (W.	   Va.	   2006);	   Rogers	   v.	  Westerman	  Farm	  Co.,	  29	  P.3d	  887,	  906	  (Colo.	  2001);	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	   rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259	  (Okla.	  1994).	  	  	   53.	  	   See	  infra	  Part	  III.C.	  	   54.	  	   WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  §	  645.	  	  	   55.	  	  	  Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  2.	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1. Colorado 
The first marketable product approach in Colorado is the antithesis of the historical 
view, largely discarding the traditional meaning of at the well clauses.56 The Colorado 
Supreme Court has held that where a lease does not provide express allocation of costs, 
the implied duty to market imposes upon the lessee all costs necessary to bring the gas to 
a marketable state, including transportation costs.57 Further, in leases that use the “at the 
well” language, the court, while acknowledging that the majority view is to the contrary, 
has held that such terminology is silent as to costs.58 The court has concluded that it is 
therefore unnecessary in these cases to allow a calculation using work-back because the 
post-productions costs generally deducted under the at the well approach are often ex-
penses required to place gas in marketable condition.59 
Further expanding, and perhaps complicating, the meaning of the approach, the 
Colorado Supreme Court has held that to determine if marketable gas exists, courts must 
evaluate its “condition” and “location.”60 The condition factor simply relates to a state at 
which the gas is capable of commercial sale; the complication arises with the “location” 
element.61 Pursuant to the court’s location analysis, a lessee must incur all transportation 
expenses and must additionally bring the gas to a “commercial marketplace.”62 Effec-
tively, the lessee must transport gas, which may already be in a marketable condition at 
the well, to a location where an actual sale can occur.63 This transportation is of course 
all at the expense of the lessee.64 Despite the potentially harsh implication of this ap-
proach on lessees, a degree of leeway with cost allocation is allowed where, after gas be-
comes marketable (remember, it has to be able to reach a commercial marketplace first), 
further transportation or enhancements add value.65 Unfortunately, this leeway does not 
reduce the likelihood that, despite contractual expectations, lessees or producers will un-
fairly shoulder most, if not all, of the post-production expenses incurred to reach the re-
quired commercial marketplace.66 
2. Kansas 
The Kansas Supreme Court takes a slightly more moderate approach than Colora-
do.67 Although Kansas, like Colorado, imposes upon the lessee the bulk of post-
                                                	   56.	  	   See	  generally	  Rogers,	  29	  P.3d	  at	  906	  (the	  court	  determined	  that	   the	  at	   the	  well	   leases	  under	  re-­‐view	  were	  silent	  as	  to	  allocation	  of	  post-­‐production	  costs	  and	  that,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  first	  marketa-­‐ble	  product	  doctrine,	  the	  lessee	  must	  incur	  all	  costs	  necessary	  to	  render	  a	  product	  marketable).	  	  	   57.	  	   Id.	  	  	   58.	  	   Id.	  at	  899-­‐901,	  906.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  904.	  	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  at	  905.	  	   61.	  	   See	  Rogers,	  29	  P.3d	  at	  905.	  	  	   62.	  	   Id.	  at	  906.	  	  	   63.	  	   See	  id.	  	   64.	  	   Id.	  	   65.	  	   Id.	  	  	  	   66.	  	   See	  generally	  Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  88	  (discussing	  that	  when	  a	  court	  chooses	  not	  to	  follow	  the	  plain	  meaning	  of	  contracts,	   it	  violates	   the	  relationship	   formed	  between	  the	  parties,	   in	  some	  cases	  completely	  disregarding	  their	  expectations).	  	   67.	  	   Compare	  Sternberger	  v.	  Marathon	  Oil	  Co.,	  894	  P.2d	  788,	  800	  (Kan.	  1995)	  (allowing	  for	  deduction	  of	  post-­‐production	  costs	   involving	  transportation)	  with	  Rogers,	  29	  P.3d	  at	  906	  (disallowing	  the	  deduc-­‐tion	  of	  post-­‐production	  cost,	  including	  transportation,	  unless	  they	  occur	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  marketa-­‐
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production costs necessary to achieve a marketable product, it does allow for deduction 
of reasonable transportation costs.68 Kansas courts also impose the implied covenant to 
market, which requires that lessees render gas in a marketable condition, and thus, the 
lessee bears the costs needed to achieve this state.69 Interestingly, the Kansas Supreme 
Court has held that gas might be considered marketable at the well, even without the ex-
istence of a market at the well, so long as all that remains to bring the gas to a market is a 
pipeline.70 
In Kansas, if there is no market at the well for which the lessee can sell the pro-
duced gas and the gas is otherwise in marketable form, then the lessee may deduct from 
the royalty interest holder’s payment reasonable transportation expenses incurred in 
bringing the gas to market.71 This is in stark contrast to Colorado’s first marketable 
product approach, which would not find gas marketable where no commercial market for 
it exists at the well, nor would it allow deduction for such transportation costs.72 Despite 
Kansas’s variation on the first marketable product doctrine with respect to transportation 
costs, its approach still imposes an economic burden on lessees that seemingly defies 
party expectations and forces them to shoulder the bulk of post-production expenses.73 
3. West Virginia 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is one of the more recent states to 
adopt its own variation of the first marketable product doctrine, and it bears similarity to 
Colorado’s approach.74 Although West Virginia has limited case law, the court deter-
mined that under the implied covenant to market, lessees must bear all costs necessary to 
create and bring marketable gas to the point of sale.75 Further, the court has held that 
leases containing “at the well” clauses are ambiguous as to the allocation or deduction of 
post-production costs.76 Thus, absent express language allocating such costs between les-
sor and lessee, the lessee must bear all post-production costs, including transportation.77 
When evaluating the language of the lease, the court has held that as a “general rule . . . 
oil and gas leases . . . will generally be liberally construed in favor of the lessor and 
strictly against the lessee.”78 These rulings stand for the proposition that the stance of 
West Virginia is one that, much like other marketable product states, does not shy from 
placing a financial burden on the lessee.79 
                                                                                                                    ble	  product).	  	   68.	  	   Sternberger,	  894	  P.2d	  at	  800.	  	  	   69.	  	   See	  Smith	  v.	  Amoco,	  31	  P.3d	  255	  (Kan.	  2001).	  	   70.	  	   Sternberger,	  894	  P.2d	  at	  800.	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  	   72.	  	   See	  Rogers,	  29	  P.3d	  at	  906.	  	  	   73.	  	   See	  generally	  Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  88	  (discussing	  that	  when	  a	  court	  chooses	  not	  to	  follow	  the	  plain	  meaning	  of	  contracts,	   it	  violates	   the	  relationship	   formed	  between	  the	  parties,	   in	  some	  cases	  completely	  disregarding	  their	  expectations).	  	  	  	   74.	  	   Compare	  Rogers,	  29	  P.3d	  at	  906	  (imposing	  the	  bulk	  of	  post-­‐production	  costs	  on	  the	  lessee	  via	  an	  application	  of	  the	  implied	  covenant	  to	  market)	  with	  Wellman	  v.	  Energy	  Res.,	  Inc.,	  557	  S.E.2d	  254,	  264-­‐65	  (W.	  Va.	  2006)	  (imposing	  the	  bulk	  of	  post-­‐production	  costs	  on	  lessee	  via	  the	  implied	  covenant	  to	  market).	  	  	   75.	  	   Wellman,	  557	  S.E.2d	  at	  264-­‐65.	  	   76.	  	   Estate	  of	  Tawney	  v.	  Columbia	  Nat.	  Res.,	  L.L.C.,	  633	  S.E.2d	  22,	  28	  (W.	  Va.	  2006).	  	   77.	  	   Id.	  at	  30.	  	   78.	  	   Id.	  at	  29	  (quoting	  Martin	  v.	  Consol.	  Coal	  &	  Oil	  Corp.,	  133	  S.E.	  626,	  628	  (W.	  Va.	  1926)).	  	   79.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  30.	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IV. OKLAHOMA’S GRAVITATION AWAY FROM DEDUCTIBILITY 
Unlike its behemoth oil and gas producing sister to the south, Oklahoma has re-
belled against the at the well approach by adopting its own variation of the first marketa-
ble product doctrine.80 Through an analysis of some of the most prominent cases over the 
last few decades, a better picture of Oklahoma’s variation of the doctrine will come to 
light.81 It will also aid in demonstrating that Oklahoma’s adoption of the principle is 
problematic and not in the best interests of the state.82 
A. Origins 
In 1970, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma began laying the groundwork for the 
state’s own variation of the first marketable product doctrine.83 In Johnson v. Jernigan,84 
the lessors brought suit against the lessees, alleging that they improperly deducted trans-
portation costs from their one-eighth royalty interest in production proceeds.85 The lease 
provided that the lessors would receive “[one-eighth] of the gross proceeds at the prevail-
ing market rate for all gas sold off the premises.”86 The lessors argued that such language 
entitled them to a portion of the proceeds free from deduction of transportation and mar-
keting costs.87 The court disagreed.88 In reaching its decision, the court focused on the 
clause language providing that the lessors’ payment was to be determined by the prevail-
ing market rate.89 The court asserted that “[m]arket rate means the rate at which the gas 
is commonly sold in the vicinity of the well. It is the market rate at the wellhead or in the 
field that determines the sale price, and not the market rate at the purchaser’s location.”90 
Despite finding that no such market existed at the well,91 the court ruled that the 
lessees had no obligation to lay pipeline beyond the area described in the lease.92 How-
ever, the court clarified, that this was not to say that the lessees did not have a duty to 
reasonably take steps to maximize the value of the gas.93 In aligning with the consensus 
view, the court explained that a lack of market price can generally be attributed to an ab-
sence of a pipeline connection to the place of sale.94 In these cases, there are instances in 
which a lessee must construct a pipeline beyond the leased premise to reach the market.95 
If this need occurs, “the market price of the royalty gas is the price paid at the place of 
                                                	   80.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt	   v.	   Santa	   Fe	  Minerals,	   Inc.,	   954	  P.2d	   1203,	   1205,	   1210	   (Okla.	   1998);	   TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	  rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259,	  263	  (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880,	  883	  (Okla.	  1992).	  	   81.	  	   See	  infra	  Part	  IV.A-­‐C.	  	  	  	   82.	  	   See	  infra	  Part	  V.B.	  	   83.	  	   See	  Johnson	  v.	  Jernigan,	  475	  P.2d	  396,	  398	  (Okla.	  1970).	  	  	   84.	  	   Id.	  at	  396.	  	  	   85.	  	   Id.	  at	  397.	  	   86.	  	   Id.	  	   87.	  	   Id.	  at	  397-­‐98.	  	   88.	  	   Johnson,	  475	  P.2d	  at	  398-­‐99.	  	  	   89.	  	   Id.	  	  	  	   90.	  	   Id.	  at	  398.	  	  	   91.	  	   Id.	  	   92.	  	   Id.	  at	  399.	  	   93.	  	   Johnson,	  475	  P.2d	  at	  399.	  	  	   94.	  	   Id.	  at	  398.	  	  	   95.	  	   Id.	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sale, less the additional cost of transporting to market”—96 a proposition in accord with 
the court’s ruling that the lessees properly deducted transportation costs for the construc-
tion of the pipeline.97 It is important to note that in releasing its decision, the court ex-
plicitly limited its holding to transportation expenses only.98 
B. The Great Upheaval 
1. Wood v. TXO Production Corporation 
Oklahoma’s more apparent shift toward the first marketable product doctrine be-
gan with the 1992 case of Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp.,99 where the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court responded to a certified question asking whether a lessee may deduct the expenses 
from compression when calculating royalty payments.100 In Wood, the lessee built com-
pressors during the course of production so that it could meet the necessary well pressure 
levels for delivery of the gas to market.101 The lessee subsequently deducted compression 
costs from the lessor’s royalty payment proportionate to his interest.102 The lessor 
brought suit, claiming that such deductions from his royalty payment were prohibited.103 
The royalty in the lease provided for “3/16 at the market price at the well for gas sold.”104 
Interestingly, in siding with the lessor, the court rejected the lessee’s argument that com-
pression costs fell under the definition of transportation costs as provided in Jernigan.105 
The court explained that gas is “sold” at the point in which it enters the pipeline and that 
because the pipeline was located on the property, there were, in effect, no transportation 
costs for the lessee to deduct.106 Further, the court reasoned, if the parties intended to al-
locate compression costs to the lessor, they could have expressly agreed to do so in the 
lease.107 
In a more measurable shift toward the first marketable product approach, the court 
aligned itself with the Supreme Court of Kansas, finding that the duty to market demands 
that the lessee prepare gas for market or achieve a marketable product, which, in Okla-
homa, includes compression as well as associated costs.108 Notably, it appears that “the 
court simply assumed that compression was necessary to put the gas in marketable con-
dition without even attempting to explain how it reached this conclusion . . . .”109 Fur-
ther, the mere act of compressing the gas before sending it to market is not, as a general 
matter, a condition precedent to creating a marketable product.110 Unfortunately, the 
court continued to expand its list of prohibited deductions beyond compression a couple 
                                                	   96.	  	   Id.	  	   97.	  	   Id.	  at	  400.	  	   98.	  	   Johnson,	  475	  P.2d	  at	  400.	  	  	   99.	  	   See	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880,	  882-­‐83	  (Okla.	  1992).	  	   100.	  	   Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  880.	  	   101.	  	   Id.	  at	  880-­‐81.	  	  	   102.	  	   Id.	  	   103.	  	   Id.	  at	  881.	  	  	   104.	  	   Id.	  at	  880.	  	  	   105.	  	   Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  881.	  	   106.	  	   Id.	  	  	   107.	  	   Id.	  at	  885.	  	   108.	  	   Id.	  at	  882.	  	  	   109.	  	   Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  686.	  	   110.	  	   Id.	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years later in another precedential case.111 
2. TXO Production Corporation v. State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office 
In TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land Office,112 the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma addressed whether a lessee could deduct post-production costs including 
“compression, dehydration, and gathering” from the lessor’s royalty payment.113 The 
court concluded that such post-production costs were not allocable to the lessor and, pur-
suant to the lessee’s duty to achieve a marketable product, it must bear all related ex-
penses.114 Pointing to its decision in Wood, the court expressed that it had already deter-
mined that compression costs were necessary for placing gas in marketable form, but 
acknowledged that it had not specifically addressed dehydration or gathering.115 It looked 
to the definitions of both processes to reach its conclusion.116 The court defined dehydra-
tion as “removal of moisture from gas before it enter’s [sic] the purchaser’s pipeline,”117 
while it defined gathering as “the process of collecting gas at the point of production (the 
wellhead) and moving it to a collection point for further movement through a pipeline’s 
principal transmission system.”118 The court concluded that because the processes oc-
curred prior to entering the purchaser’s pipeline, they were necessary for the preparation 
of marketable gas.119 Thus, it appears that the court simply made a blanket assertion that 
these costs were required for the formation of a marketable product, providing no cost-
sharing leeway absent a provision expressing otherwise.120 Reiterating its ruling in 
Wood, the court explained that with regard to post-production costs, it expressly rejected 
the Texas view allowing for proportionate deduction,121 thereby cementing Oklahoma as 
an adopter of the first marketable product approach.122 
3. Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc. 
In Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals Inc.,123 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma an-
swered a certified question asking whether a lessee may deduct post-production costs 
such as “transportation, compression, dehydration, and blending” from a royalty interest 
payment.124 The court muddied the waters of its variation of the first marketable product 
doctrine by effectively responding with a resounding “maybe.”125 In this case, the lessee 
sent the gas offsite to third parties who dealt with the post-production processes.126 The 
                                                	   111.	  	   See	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	  rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259,	  260	  (Okla.	  1994).	  	   112.	  	   Id.	  at	  259.	  	   113.	  	   Id.	  at	  260.	  	  	   114.	  	   Id.	  at	  262.	  	   115.	  	   Id.	  	   116.	  	   TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  262.	  	  	   117.	  	   Id.	  	   118.	  	   Id.	  	   119.	  	   Id.	  at	  262-­‐63.	  	   120.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   121.	  	   TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  263.	  	  	   122.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   123.	  	   Mittelstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203	  (Okla.	  1998).	  	   124.	  	   Id.	  at	  1204-­‐05.	  	  	   125.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  1205.	  	   126.	  	   Id.	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lessee paid fees to these third parties and when they were finished with their work, they 
sent the gas downstream to a pipeline where a sale could be made.127 The lessors sued 
the lessee because the lessee deducted from royalty payments those costs incurred in 
marketing the gas.128 The language of the lease expressed that the lessee would pay the 
lessor “3/16 of the gross proceeds, at the mouth of the well, received by lessee for the 
gas.”129 Based solely on the language of the lease, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma con-
cluded that deduction of post-production costs from the payment was impermissible.130 
However, with an apparent itch to further modify its stance on deductibility, the court 
explained that in some circumstances, a lessor is obligated to bear his proportionate 
share.131 It is already difficult for a lessee to know when such circumstances are present 
and the court only made this determination more difficult by forcing lessees to satisfy a 
complex set of factors.132 The court expressed that a lessee may deduct costs if it can 
show the following: “(1) [T]hat the costs enhanced the value of an already marketable 
product, (2) that such costs are reasonable, and (3) that actual royalty revenues increased 
in proportion with the costs assessed against the nonworking interest.”133 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had previously determined that post-production 
costs, except for transportation, were not allocable to the lessor.134 This rule changed 
with the adoption of the above-mentioned factors, which allowed proportionate sharing if 
the process enhanced an already marketable product.135 In answering the question, and 
despite the factors, the court implied that the lessee had not satisfied them.136 It conclud-
ed that gas must be in marketable form before these factors can apply and that costs from 
offsite work necessary to achieve this form are not deductible.137 Further, agreeing with 
the Kansas view, the court concluded that the lessee must solely bear even the transporta-
tion costs incurred in bringing the gas to the third parties.138 Thus, the court did not inval-
idate Jernigan, which allowed sharing transportation costs; rather, it established that the 
lessee must bear all transportation costs necessary to achieve a marketable product.139 
Of significant importance is the dissent, which mentioned one of the major flaws 
that flowed from both the Mittelstaedt opinion as well as from the ruling in Wood.140 In 
these cases, the court required a lessee to render a product marketable, but in determining 
whether a product was in fact marketable, it treated the issue “as a question of law rather 
than one of fact.”141 The court simply glossed over factual questions that naturally and 
inevitably arise in gas disputes, particularly when the determination of market conditions 
                                                	   127.	  	   Id.	  	   128.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1204.	  	  	   129.	  	   Id.	  at	  1206.	  	  	   130.	  	   Id.	  at	  1205.	  	   131.	  	   See	  id.	  	   132.	  	   See	  Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  688.	  	   133.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1205.	  	   134.	  	   Id.	  	   135.	  	   Id.	  	   136.	  	   Id.	  at	  1210.	  	   137.	  	   Id.	  	   138.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1210.	  	   139.	  	   Id.	  	   140.	  	   Id.	  at	  1213-­‐14	  (Opala,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  	  	   141.	  	   Id.	  at	  1213.	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is involved.142 Instead, in its ruling on the issue, “the court arbitrarily declare[d] certain 
costs as necessary to produce a marketable product . . . [and] [s]ans factual inquiry, it is 
impossible to determine the very existence of a market.”143 Although the dissent went on 
to disapprove of the at the well approach and concocted its own variation of marketable 
product, the premise still stands with respect to the majority ruling: that treatment of 
marketability as a question of law is particularly flawed.144 This is not to say however, 
that treating the marketable product determination as a question of fact is a sufficient re-
mediation of the inherent problems with the first marketable product doctrine either.145 
C. Odd Man Out: The Oklahoma Overriding Royalty Interest Exception 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma deviated from its first marketable prod-
uct approach when it ruled on a case concerning deduction of post-production costs from 
an overriding royalty interest, which is different from the standard royalty interests.146 
Defining this type of interest may be helpful, so putting it simply, an overriding royalty 
interest is “[a]n interest in oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expense of pro-
duction, and in addition to the usual landowner’s royalty reserved to the lessor in an oil 
and gas lease.”147 In XAE Corp. v. SMR Property Management Co.,148 the court was 
faced with determining whether overriding royalty interest owners were entitled to com-
pensation for the deduction of “gathering, processing, and compress[ion]” expenses from 
their payments.149 The defendant’s predecessor in title conveyed the interest holders an 
in-kind interest that was “free and clear of all costs and expenses whatsoever.”150 Alt-
hough in-kind interests are not typically associated with gas royalty clauses due to fac-
tors such as economics or infeasibility of storage,151 the conveyance in this case was ac-
tually in-kind for gas.152 However, rather than accept an in-kind payment, the interest 
holders opted to grant the lessee the right to market the gas.153 After the lessee deducted 
post-production costs, the interest holders sued, alleging that such deductions were disal-
lowed pursuant to Oklahoma law as well as the implied duty to market or to achieve a 
marketable product.154 
The court declined to grant the overriding interests the same protection afforded to 
royalty interests, holding that “unless expressly assumed, implied covenants of oil and 
gas leases do not extend to lease assignments with reservation of overriding royalty in-
terest.”155 Of particular importance, the court noted that the assignment of the overriding 
                                                	   142.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  1214.	  	   143.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1214	  (Opala,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  	  	  	  	   144.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  1214-­‐15.	  	  	  	   145.	  	   Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  702-­‐03.	  	  	   146.	  	   See,	   for	   example,	  Part	   IV.B	   for	  more	   information	  about	   standard	   royalty	   interests;	  see	  also	   XAE	  Corp.	  v.	  SMR	  Prop.	  Mgmt.	  Co.,	  968	  P.2d	  1201,	  1204	  (Okla.	  1998).	  	  	   147.	  	   8-­‐O	  HOWARD	  R.	  WILLIAMS	  &	  CHARLES	  J.	  MEYERS,	  OIL	  AND	  GAS	  LAW	  55	  (Matthew	  Bender	  &	  Co.	  ed.,	  Lex-­‐isNexis	  2012).	  	   148.	  	   XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1201.	  	  	   149.	  	   Id.	  at	  1202.	  	   150.	  	   Id.	  	   151.	  	   See	  WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  14;	  see	  also	  LOWE	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  12.	  	   152.	  	   XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1202.	  	  	   153.	  	   Id.	  at	  1202-­‐03.	  	  	   154.	  	   Id.	  at	  1203.	  	   155.	  	   Id.	  at	  1202,	  1204.	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interest contained no language indicating the imposition of the same obligations created 
by the underlying lessor-lessee relationship found in the lease.156 Further, given that the 
overriding royalty interest was in-kind, the only payment due to the interest holders was 
that which the lessee produced and delivered at the wellhead.157 The lessee’s mere grant 
of permission to market the gas did not also impose upon it an obligation to incur costs 
associated with making the gas marketable.158 Thus, in the case of an overriding royalty 
interest, the requirement for a marketable product is inapplicable, and the lessee may de-
duct post-production costs from the interest payment.159 
XAE Corp. is particularly interesting because in discussing its ruling, the court re-
jected the Colorado Supreme Court’s interpretation of Oklahoma law as imposing the 
implied duty to market on overriding royalty interests.160 In disagreeing with Colorado’s 
interpretation, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma looked to earlier case law, which notably 
occurred years before it adopted the marketable product doctrine, allowing for deduction 
of post-production costs from overriding royalty interests.161 
V. PARSING IT ALL: UNDERSTANDING FIRST MARKETABLE PRODUCT IN OKLAHOMA AND 
ACKNOWLEDGING ITS FLAWS 
A. Translating the Cases 
From Jernigan to XAE Corp., the Oklahoma Supreme Court weaved a web of de-
cisions that, somewhat confusingly, expressed its view on the role of the first marketable 
product approach in Oklahoma.162 From these rulings, it is clear that where a lease is si-
lent as to the allocation of post-production costs, the implied duty to market or to achieve 
a marketable product controls.163 These post-production costs include compression, de-
hydration, blending, gathering, and similar processes.164 The court views these processes 
as necessary for achieving a marketable product, and therefore, a lessee may not deduct 
them from a lessor’s royalty payment.165 Although, it is interesting that the court, as a 
general matter, treats these processes as inherently necessary for rendering a product 
marketable.166 This determination, according to the court, is a question of law rather than 
fact.167 Transportation costs are generally proportionately allocable if the pipeline con-
necting to the point of sale is beyond the leased premise, but there is no sharing of the 
costs of transporting gas offsite for processing if the reason for doing so is to achieve a 
                                                	   156.	  	   Id.	  at	  1207.	  	   157.	  	   XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1207.	  	  	   158.	  	   Id.	  	  	   159.	  	   Id.	  at	  1208.	  	   160.	  	   Id.	  at	  1206.	  	   161.	  	   Id.	  at	  1205.	  	   162.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt	  v.	   Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	   Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203	   (Okla.	  1998);	  XAE	  Corp.	  v.	   SMR	  Prop.	  Mgmt.	  Co.,	  968	  P.2d	  1201	  (Okla.	  1998);	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	  rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259	  (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880	  (Okla.	  1992);	  Johnson	  v.	  Jernigan,	  475	  P.2d	  396	  (Okla.	  1970).	  	   163.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1210;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  262;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  882.	  	   164.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1205;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  262;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  881.	  	   165.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1205;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  262;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  881.	  	   166.	  	   See	  Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  686.	  	   167.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1213	  (Opala,	  J.,	  dissenting).	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marketable product.168 As held in Mittelstaedt, if after achieving a marketable product a 
lessee can demonstrate enhancement, reasonable expenses, and a correlative increase in 
royalty revenue proportionate to the cost of improvement, it may deduct the costs of such 
enhancement.169 Additionally, Oklahoma courts do not afford overriding royalty interests 
the protections of the implied duty to market that is derived from the lessor-lessee rela-
tionship, and therefore, unlike standard royalties, deductions for post-production costs 
are allowed.170 
B. Problems with First Marketable Product in Oklahoma 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s decision to adopt the first marketable product 
doctrine is problematic and largely serves as a complication for the oil and gas indus-
try.171 With major natural gas companies such as Devon Energy and Chesapeake Energy 
headquartered and conducting business in Oklahoma, it would seem entirely reasonable 
to avoid unclear or unwieldy jurisprudence that is unnecessarily burdensome and harmful 
to the expansion of the industry.172 Unfortunately, based simply on the court’s adoption 
of the doctrine, it is patently clear that it does not view such an approach as problematic 
for the handling of cost deduction disputes.173 Perhaps the most obvious and frustrating 
issue with Oklahoma’s variation—and for that matter, other states that have adopted the 
approach—is the lack of clarity in the definition of “marketable product” and when it is 
achieved.174 A cursory reading of Oklahoma’s rulings on the matter shows that the court 
has consistently failed to provide a true litmus test for determining whether a lessee has 
created a marketable product—save for a blanket requirement that mostly everything 
prior to reaching the purchaser’s pipeline is nondeductible.175 This understanding, of 
course, seemingly creates a presumption that processes occurring prior to sending gas to 
the purchaser’s pipeline are strictly necessary to achieve a marketable product.176 Oil and 
gas scholar Professor David Pierce of Washburn University School of Law contends that 
courts applying the approach “tend to push the royalty valuation point further down-
stream from the wellhead into separate business enterprises in which the lessor was never 
intended to participate.”177 As a consequence, he argues, “the lessor shares in the rewards 
of such separate businesses without exposure to any of the risks.”178 
                                                	   168.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  id.	  at	  1210.	  	  	   169.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1205.	  	  	   170.	  	   XAE	  Corp.	  v.	  SMR	  Prop.	  Mgmt.	  Co.,	  968	  P.2d	  1201	  (Okla.	  1998).	  	   171.	  	   See	  generally	  William	  F.	  Carr	  &	  Paul	  R.	  Owen,	  Clear	  as	  Crude:	  Defending	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Royalty	  Litiga-­‐
tion,	  37	  NAT.	  RESOURCES	  J.	  695,	  706	  (1997)	  (discussing	  the	  damage	  the	  first	  marketable	  product	  doctrine	  can	  have	  on	  those	  states	  that	  have	  adopted	  it).	  	   172.	  	   CHESAPEAKE	   ENERGY	   CORP.,	   http://www.chk.com/Pages/Contact.aspx	   (last	   visited	   Nov.	   1,	   2013);	  DEVON	  ENERGY	  CORP.,	  http://www.devonenergy.com/Pages/devon_energy_home.aspx	  (last	  visited	  Nov.	  1,	  2013).	  	   173.	  	   See	   Mittelstaedt,	   954	   P.2d	   1203;	   XAE	   Corp.,	   968	   P.2d	   1201;	   TXO	   Prod.	   Corp.	   v.	   State	   ex	   rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259	  (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880	  (Okla.	  1992);	  Johnson	  v.	  Jernigan,	  475	  P.2d	  396	  (Okla.	  1970).	  	   174.	  	   Brian	  S.	  Wheeler,	  Deducting	  Post-­‐Production	  Costs	  When	  Calculating	  Royalty:	  What	  Does	  the	  Lease	  
Provide?	  8	  APPALACHIAN	  J.L.	  1,	  10	  (2008).	  	  	   175.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1205;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  262-­‐63;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  883.	  	   176.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1205;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  260-­‐63;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  883;	  see	  
also	  Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  686.	  	  	   177.	  	   Pierce,	  supra	  note	  34.	  	   178.	  	   Id.	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Moreover, the lack of clarity in what constitutes “marketable” produces a situation 
ripe for litigation that is both costly and judicially congesting.179 Oklahoma’s treatment 
of the term as one defined as a matter of law only serves to complicate this further be-
cause it skips often necessary factual inquiries,180 such as whether a market for gas actu-
ally exists at all.181 Surely such a factual determination is necessary when determining 
the marketability of a product.182 As one Oklahoma Supreme Court justice remarked, 
“[t]reating marketability as a question of law ignores market realities.”183 This is not to 
say, however, that making the marketable product determination on a factual basis is any 
more rational.184 Given the inevitable factual inquiries needed to determine whether pro-
cesses constitute “preparation” or “enhancement” of a marketable product, the fodder for 
disputes is limitless.185 Further, because of the inherent factual differences that will inevi-
tably occur case-to-case, “the results of any particular case will be of virtually no use in 
determining the parties’ rights and obligations in any other case.”186 These problems are 
only compounded by the lack of a clear test for determining whether a lessee has created 
a marketable product.187 The uncertainty with making this determination leaves the les-
see in a difficult position where it may not be able to comfortably conclude whether it 
has achieved a marketable product,188 the consequence of which is a potential vulnerabil-
ity to lawsuits brought by lessors claiming that the product is not marketable.189 
Another issue with Oklahoma’s approach is that it disregards the historical inter-
pretation of at the well royalty clauses, and in doing so, it seemingly ignores the express 
language of such clauses.190 As previously mentioned, at the well leases, which are fairly 
common, historically allowed for deduction from royalty payments those costs incurred 
post-production.191 But the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has, of course, expressly reject-
ed this interpretation.192 By rejecting this interpretation, the court does what has become 
a common thread with marketable product states: it disregards the plain and understood 
meaning of these types of lease provisions.193 Instead, the court construes at the well 
clauses as meaning something that goes beyond calculation at the wellhead, moving the 
calculation point into post-production processes.194 This is problematic because it has the 
                                                	   179.	  	   Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  701.	  	   180.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  at	  702-­‐03	  (discussing	  that	  states	  adopting	  the	  first	  marketable	  product	  doctrine	  exacerbate	   the	   problem	   of	   frequent	   litigation	   by	   failing	   to	   provide	   “specific	   criteria”	   for	   resolving	   the	  many	  factual	  questions	  that	  arise).	  	  	   181.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1213-­‐14	  (Opala,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  	   182.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   183.	  	   Id.	  	  	   184.	  	   Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  702-­‐03.	  	   185.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   186.	  	   Id.	  	  	   187.	  	   See	  generally	  Wheeler,	  supra	  note	  174.	  	  	   188.	  	   Edward	   B.	   Poitevent,	   II,	   Post-­‐Production	   Deductions	   from	   Royalty,	   44	   S.	   TEX	   L.	   REV.	   709,	   759	  (2003).	  	  	   189.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   190.	  	   See	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880,	  882-­‐83	  (Okla.	  1992);	  see	  also	  Carr	  &	  Owen,	  supra	  note	  171	  (contending	  that	  under	  the	  first	  marketable	  product	  doctrine,	  “little	  or	  no	  regard	  [is	  given	  to]	  .	  .	  .	  un-­‐derlying	  lease	  language.”).	  	   191.	  	   Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1.	  	  	   192.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203	  (Okla.	  1998);	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	  
rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259	  (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  880.	  	   193.	  	   Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  85.	  	  	   194.	  	   Poitevent,	  supra	  note	  188,	  at	  759-­‐60.	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potential to and likely does exceed the contractual intentions of the parties.195 Courts 
should not exercise judicial construction when, even from a basic viewpoint, the plain 
meaning of a clause indicates where royalty calculation should occur.196 A consequence 
of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s modification of the meaning of at the well clauses 
is the creation of situations where lessors might receive benefits that they do not neces-
sarily deserve.197 
In a typical lease, a lessor receives a royalty interest that provides him with a share 
of that which the lessee produces.198 Regardless of whether the lease stipulates an in-kind 
framework or a market value or proceeds framework, the most commonly constructed 
royalty provisions do not expressly go beyond “production,”199 and courts typically in-
terpret them as having this meaning, at least in the majority states.200 Oklahoma’s inter-
pretation of such clauses as going beyond production into post-production seemingly en-
riches lessors at the expense of lessees.201 If the lease is silent and contains no express 
provision setting forth the allocation of costs and duties beyond production, why should 
the lessee bear all the risks and costs that might arise after gas is severed from the well 
while the lessor participates without any risk whatsoever?202 The simple answer is that it 
should not.203 Oklahoma’s answer to the question, in part, is the implied covenant to 
market, which, as the discussion below illustrates, has its own problems.204 For justifying 
the assertion that the lessee should not bear the cost alone, one critic provides a very sen-
sible assessment: “A royalty interest entitles a lessor to receive a share of the lessee’s 
production, not a share of the lessee’s profits.”205 Lessees should not have to share with 
lessors, free of costs and risks, benefits gained from after-production expenditures that 
make a product sellable or more sellable.206 Further, this is not a dispute where one party 
has poorly contracted with another and a simple application of the tough luck standard 
will provide resolution; rather, what the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is effectively doing 
is granting lessors privileges and benefits that potentially go beyond that which the par-
ties intended.207 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma justifies placing additional obligations on lessees 
in the post-production stage with the implied duty or covenant to market.208 In Oklaho-
ma, this implied duty demands that the lessee achieve a marketable product, and from 
                                                	   195.	  	   Id.	  	  	   196.	  	   Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  85.	  	   197.	  	   See	  generally	  Pierce,	  supra	  note	  34.	  	  	   198.	  	   See	  Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  13-­‐20;	  see	  also	  WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  8.	  	   199.	  	   See	  Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  13-­‐20;	  see	  also	  WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  8.	  	   200.	  	   Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1.	  	  	   201.	  	   For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  general	  impact	  caused	  by	  pushing	  royalty	  payment	  calculation	  beyond	  the	  wellhead,	  see,	  Pierce,	  supra	  note	  34.	  	   202.	  	   See	  id.	  	   203.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   204.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203,	  1209-­‐10	  (Okla.	  1998);	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	   rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259,	  263	   (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880,	  882-­‐83	  (Okla.	  1992).	  	   205.	  	   Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  95.	  	   206.	  	   Pierce,	  supra	  note	  34.	  	   207.	  	   See	  generally	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  882-­‐83	  (holding	  that	  at	  the	  well	  lease	  language	  was	  ambiguous,	  and	  stating	  that	  if	  the	  lessee	  intended	  to	  impose	  post-­‐production	  costs	  on	  the	  lessors,	  it	  should	  have	  ex-­‐pressly	  included	  such	  language	  in	  the	  lease);	  see	  also	  Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  95-­‐96.	  	   208.	  	   Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1209-­‐10;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  263;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  882-­‐83.	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this requirement arises the expectation that lessees, at their sole expense, engage in post-
production processes when they are deemed necessary.209 Traditionally, the implied cov-
enant to market “has been viewed as a duty to use reasonable diligence in seeking a mar-
ket and not as a duty relating to the amount of royalty to be paid.”210 Further, courts are 
not meant to apply it in situations where it runs counter to the lease’s express lan-
guage.211 Despite this standard, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has imposed the duty to 
market on lessees irrespective of the plain and express content of the specific lease under 
review.212 Jurisdictions mixing the implied covenant to market with the deduction of 
post-production costs have endured criticism for the unwieldy marriage it produces.213 
This criticism arises because claims using the implied covenant as a basis often do not 
actually allege irresponsible marketing by the lessee, but instead involve the assertion 
that the lessee made improper royalty calculations.214 By accepting claims like these as 
valid, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has expanded the traditional meaning of the im-
plied duty to market from a reasonable diligence standard to one that dictates royalty 
payment and calculation.215 However, this expansion is fundamentally erroneous, as one 
commentator noted, the implied covenant “does not mean he [the lessee] is to pay all 
costs of marketing, nor that he is to process the gas. Expenses incurred in procuring a 
market must be borne proportionately by the lessor. The lessee is not obligated to move 
gas beyond the well mouth free of cost.”216 
Perhaps the biggest elephant in the room is the ruling in XAE Corp. concerning the 
deduction of costs from overriding royalty interests.217 There is generally no question 
that overriding royalty interests are distinct from standard royalty interests.218 When the 
court ruled that the assignment of the overriding royalty did not carry the implied cove-
nant protection that the lease carried, it made clear the distinction between the two inter-
ests.219 This discussion does not set out to criticize the court’s decision to allow deducti-
bility from the interest per se, but rather to emphasize, in general, the unpredictability of 
the court’s implementation of the marketable product approach.220 In disagreeing with 
the Colorado Supreme Court’s interpretation of Oklahoma law, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma thrust into the picture a further variation in the marketable product ap-
proach.221 The first issue with this is that it appears that even those courts opting to im-
plement the marketable product approach have difficulty finding symmetry with sister 
                                                	   209.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1209-­‐10;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  263;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  882-­‐83.	  	   210.	  	   Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  n.345.	  	  	   211.	  	   Scott	  Lansdown,	  The	  Implied	  Marketing	  Covenant	  in	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Leases:	  The	  Producer’s	  Perspective,	  31	  ST.	  MARY’S	  L.J.	  297,	  306	  (2000).	  	  	   212.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1209-­‐10;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  263;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  882-­‐83.	  	   213.	  	   Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  211,	  at	  335-­‐36.	  	  	   214.	  	   Id.	  	   215.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt,	  954	  P.2d	  at	  1209-­‐10;	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  903	  P.2d	  at	  263;	  Wood,	  854	  P.2d	  at	  882-­‐83.	  	   216.	  	   Marla	  J.	  Williams	  et	  al.,	  Determining	  the	  Lessor’s	  Royalty	  Share	  of	  Production	  Costs:	  Is	  the	  Implied	  
Covenant	   to	  Market	   the	  Appropriate	  Analytical	  Framework?	  41	  ROCKY	  MTN.	  MIN.	  L.	   INST.	  12.01,	  12.04[1]	  (1995).	  	  	   217.	  	   XAE	  Corp.	  v.	  SMR	  Prop.	  Mgmt.	  Co.,	  968	  P.2d	  1201	  (Okla.	  1998).	  	   218.	  	   See	  WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  147.	  	   219.	  	   See	  XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1202.	  	  	   220.	  	   Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  82.	  	  	   221.	  	   See	  XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1208.	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jurisdictions.222 Admittedly, it is a thin argument to claim a flaw exists simply because a 
court in one jurisdiction interpreted the law of another jurisdiction differently from the 
court actually seated there.223 However, it does demonstrate that even the highest courts 
in these states appear to have trouble assessing the law of other states following the ap-
proach.224 It begs the question then: how can corporations effectively engage in business 
and make decisions regarding deductibility in these states when the visible lack of con-
sensus and clarity with the doctrine produces innumerable litigation risks?225 
The second issue turns specifically on Oklahoma’s refusal to apply the implied 
covenant to market to the overriding royalty interest.226 The court justified its refusal by 
pointing to the lack of express language in the assignment granting the interest holder the 
same implied covenant benefits intrinsic in the lessor-lessee relationship.227 It is interest-
ing that the court chose to acknowledge the plain and express language of the agreement 
in the overriding royalty interest case when it so blatantly failed to do so in its rulings on 
deductions from standard royalties.228 There is no denial that overriding royalty interests 
are distinct from standard royalty interests and that the assignment was a separate con-
veyance providing the interest.229 However, based on recent Oklahoma jurisprudence 
prior to XAE Corp., it would have been entirely reasonable to conclude that the implied 
covenant applied to overriding royalty interests, much as the Colorado Supreme Court 
concluded.230 Moreover, the XAE Corp. decision serves to further emphasize the abun-
dant inconsistencies that present themselves among jurisdictions adopting the marketable 
product approach.231 
VI. TRENDING THE OTHER WAY: ARE JURISDICTIONS REJECTING FIRST MARKETABLE 
PRODUCT? 
A. Indications that States are Trending against First Marketable Product 
1. Pennsylvania 
In March 2010, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down a ruling in 
Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services Inc.232 concerning the deductibility of post-production 
                                                	   222.	  	   Compare	   id.	  at	  1206,	  1208	  (where	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Oklahoma	  disagreed	  with	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Colorado	  and	  concluded	   that	  overriding	  royalty	   interests	  may	  have	  post-­‐production	  costs	  de-­‐ducted)	  with	  Garman	  v.	  Conoco,	  Inc.,	  886	  P.2d	  652,	  658	  (Colo.	  1999)	  (where	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Colo-­‐rado,	   using	   Oklahoma	   law	   for	   guidance,	   concluded	   that	   post-­‐production	   costs	   could	   not	   be	   deducted	  from	  overriding	  royalty	  interests).	  	  	   223.	  	   Compare	  XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1206,	  1208	  with	  Garman,	  886	  P.2d	  at	  658.	  	   224.	  	   Compare	  XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1206,	  1208	  with	  Garman,	  886	  P.2d	  at	  658.	  	   225.	  	   See	  Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  701-­‐03.	  	   226.	  	   XAE	  Corp.,	  968	  P.2d	  at	  1206,	  1208.	  	  	   227.	  	   Id.	  at	  1208.	  	  	   228.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203	  (Okla.	  1998);	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	  
rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259	  (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880	  (Okla.	  1992).	  	   229.	  	   See	  WILLIAMS	  &	  MEYERS,	  supra	  note	  147,	  at	  55-­‐56.	  	   230.	  	   See	  Garman	  v.	  Conoco,	  Inc.,	  886	  P.2d	  652,	  658	  (Colo.	  1999).	  	   231.	  	   See	  generally	  Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  37	   (contending	   that	   the	  marketable	  product	  approach,	  “is	  the	  ambiguous	  product	  of	  a	  widely	  varying	  and	  internally	  inconsistent	  set	  of	  commentaries	  and	  opinions.”).	  	   232.	  	   Kilmer	  v.	  Elexco	  Land	  Servs.,	  Inc.,	  990	  A.2d	  1147	  (Pa.	  2010).	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costs from royalties.233 In Kilmer, the lessors brought suit claiming that the lessee illegal-
ly deducted post-production costs.234 The lessors made several arguments for cancellation 
of the lease, the first of which was that the lessee’s deductions from royalty payments 
violated the statutory one-eighth royalty requirement.235 The lessors further argued that 
the implied duty to market applied because it was known by the legislature when it draft-
ed the statute and that, as such, it was intrinsically within the law.236 Additionally, the 
lessors contended that the implied covenant to market required calculation of the royalty 
at the point of sale and not at the well.237 The court declined to accept these arguments.238 
Under Pennsylvania law, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the 
court will not impose notions that go beyond its plain meaning.239 Most notably, in this 
case, the court acknowledged that the statute did not define “royalty,” nor did it provide a 
means for calculating royalties.240 Because of this lack of definition, the court determined 
it must define the term “royalty.”241 Despite the lessors’ definitional evidence that the 
determination point for royalties is the point of sale, the court held that under Pennsylva-
nia law it must look to the meaning of “royalty” as the oil and gas industry actually uses 
it.242 In doing so, the court held that the traditional definition of royalty provides lessors 
with a “share of production, free of expenses of production.”243 The court indicated that 
this definition was historically in line with the legislature’s intent.244 Additionally, the 
court noted that based on the time of drafting, the legislature did not have to provide a 
calculation point because at the well and point of sale were not distinguished from each 
other.245 Thus, the court concluded that under Pennsylvania law, lessees may calculate 
royalty payments at the wellhead and deduct post-production costs in such calcula-
tions.246 
Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not expressly reject the first 
marketable product doctrine, its actions indicate that, pursuant to its state law, the at the 
well approach controls.247 Further reinforcing this assertion is the fact that nearly two 
years following Kilmer, the state legislature has not enacted any law that purports to re-
ject the at the well approach or conversely adopts the first marketable product ap-
proach.248 Interestingly, a bill that would have prohibited lessees from deducting post-
production costs made it through a legislative committee, but gained no further trac-
                                                	   233.	  	   Id.	  at	  1149.	  	   234.	  	   Id.	  at	  1150.	  	  	   235.	  	   Id.	  at	  1151.	  	  	   236.	  	   Id.	  at	  1152.	  	  	  	   237.	  	   Kilmer,	  990	  A.2d	  at	  1152.	  	   238.	  	   Id.	  at	  1156-­‐57.	  	   239.	  	   Id.	  at	  1156.	  	   240.	  	   Id.	  at	  1157.	  	   241.	  	   Id.	  	   242.	  	   Kilmer,	  990	  A.2d	  at	  1157.	  	   243.	  	   Id.	  	  	   244.	  	   Id.	  at	  1158.	  	   245.	  	   Id.	  at	  1157.	  	   246.	  	   Id.	  at	  1158.	  	  	   247.	  	   See	  Kilmer,	  990	  A.2d	  at	  1158.	  	   248.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Michael	  Morris,	  Case	  Note,	  Buyer’s	  Remorse	  over	  Your	  Pennsylvania	  Gas	  Lease?	  The	  Penn-­‐
sylvania	  Supreme	  Court	  Upholds	  Meager	  Royalty	  Payments	  and	  Protects	  the	  Profitability	  of	  Marcellus	  Gas	  
Drilling	  in	  Kilmer	  v.	  Elexco	  Land	  Services,	  Inc.,	  23	  VILL.	  ENVTL.	  L.J.	  25,	  37	  (2012).	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tion.249 If anything, the legislature’s actions, or lack thereof, appear to indicate that it has 
no intention of statutorily countermanding the Kilmer ruling.250 
2. Kentucky 
In February 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled on 
Poplar Creek Development Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.251 where it addressed 
a proposed class action by lessors for the lessee’s deduction of post-production costs 
from royalty payments.252 The leases in question included royalty provisions containing 
at the well language.253 In bringing the gas to market, the lessee incurred expenses for 
“gathering, compression, and treatment” and subsequently deducted from royalty pay-
ments a proportionate share.254 The court noted that lessors described such expenses as 
“production costs,” but it concluded that as those expenses occurred after severance of 
gas from the wellhead, they should fall under the post-production cost categorization.255 
Reiterating an earlier district court ruling, the Poplar court stated that in Kentucky, “a 
presumption exists that the wellhead is the point of sale and delivery at which point the 
royalty is to be computed [on an oil and gas lease], absent an express stipulation to the 
contrary.”256 In the present case the lease provided an at the well royalty provision and 
contained no language stating otherwise.257 Consequently, the court sided with the lessee, 
declaring that Kentucky is an at the well state that permits the deduction of post-
production costs from royalty payments.258 
Notably, as one scholar acknowledged, “Kentucky state courts have not recently 
addressed the implied covenant to market or the allocation of post-production expens-
es.”259 However, despite this lack of rulings as well as the fact that the Poplar decision 
comes from a federal court, the court’s application of state law provides some insight in-
to how a Kentucky court might rule if such a case arises.260 Additionally, based on Ken-
tucky law there is little indication that the court would break with it prior rulings, par-
ticularly regarding contract construction, to align itself with first marketable product 
states.261 Until Kentucky directly rules on the issue, the at the well approach appears to 
control, and lessees may deduct post-production costs in the calculation of royalty pay-
ments.262 
                                                	   249.	  	   Id.	  	   250.	  	   Id.	  	   251.	  	   Poplar	  Creek	  Dev.	  Co.	  v.	  Chesapeake	  Appalachia,	  L.L.C.	  636	  F.3d	  235	  (6th	  Cir.	  2011).	  	   252.	  	   Id.	  at	  237-­‐38.	  	  	   253.	  	   Id.	  at	  238.	  	  	   254.	  	   Id.	  at	  238-­‐39.	  	   255.	  	   Id.	  at	  239.	  	   256.	  	   Poplar	  Creek	  Dev.	  Co.,	  636	  F.3d	  at	  242.	  	   257.	  	   Id.	  	  	   258.	  	   Id.	  at	  244.	  	   259.	  	   Patricia	  Proctor	  et	  al.,	  Moving	  Through	  the	  Rocky	  Legal	  Terrain	  to	  Find	  a	  “Safe”	  Royalty	  Clause	  or	  a	  
“New”	  Market	  at	  the	  Well,	  19	  TEX.	  WESLEYAN	  L.	  REV.	  145,	  165	  (2012).	  	   260.	  	   Id.	  at	  166.	  	  	   261.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   262.	  	   See	  Poplar	  Creek	  Dev.	  Co.,	  636	  F.3d	  at	  244.	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3. New Mexico 
In August 2012, the Supreme Court of New Mexico issued its ruling for Cono-
coPhillips Co. v. Lyons,263 where lessees brought suit against lessor, state Commissioner, 
for his assessment of underpayment charges based on lessee’s deduction of post-
production costs in the calculation of royalty payments.264 In New Mexico, the provi-
sions of state oil and gas leases are based on statutory construction.265 The statute pro-
vides for the formation of “net proceeds” leases.266 In reviewing the enactment, the court 
concluded that the statutorily provided lease language intrinsically allows for the deduc-
tion of post-production costs because net proceeds, “[b]y definition . . . constitute[] ‘the 
sum remaining from gross proceeds of sale minus payment of expenses.’”267 In analyzing 
the case, the court stated that New Mexico courts have consistently adopted the view that 
at the well leases provide for calculation of payment based on that point of valuation at 
the wellhead.268 The commissioner argued that the statute was ambiguous and that the 
phrase “in the field” set the point of valuation beyond that of the point of extraction at 
the well.269 Despite the commissioner’s contention, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
agreed with the district court’s conclusion that based on the language of the statute, “re-
quiring the state to pay reasonable compensation to state lessees for the use of their post-
production facilities indicate[s] that the Legislature was aware of . . . [what] was occur-
ring in the field with respect to post-production costs.”270 Consequently, the court ruled 
that the statutory language was not ambiguous and that it allowed for deduction of rea-
sonable costs from royalty payments.271 The court also denied the commissioner’s coun-
terclaim that the lessee breached its implied covenant to market and duty to render gas 
marketable.272 It found that the language of the statute expressed the legislature’s intent 
and review of the implied covenant to market in this case was unnecessary.273 
It is important to note that the court specifically stated that its ruling was not meant 
to impact private oil and gas leases.274 Further, the court stated that “the marketable con-
dition rule [as] applie[d] in New Mexico [was an issue] not yet ripe for review.”275 Only 
time (and a litigious private lessor) will tell whether this ruling indicates how New Mex-
ico will treat the marketable condition rule.276 However, based on the court’s definition 
of “net proceeds,” there is hope that if a private suit against a lessee arises, and involves 
an at the well provision, the court will err on the side of history and tradition by permit-
ting the deduction of post-production costs.277 
                                                	   263.	  	   ConocoPhillips	  Co.	  v.	  Lyons,	  299	  P.3d	  844	  (N.M.	  2012)	  	  	   264.	  	   Id.	  at	  847-­‐48.	  	   265.	  	   Id.	  at	  847.	  	  	   266.	  	   Id.	  at	  848.	  	   267.	  	   Id.	  	  	   268.	  	   ConocoPhillips,	  299	  P.3d	  at	  851.	  	   269.	  	   Id.	  	   270.	  	   Id.	  at	  853.	  	   271.	  	   Id.	  	  	   272.	  	   Id.	  at	  859-­‐60.	  	   273.	  	   ConocoPhillips,	  299	  P.3d	  at	  860.	  	   274.	  	   Id.	  	   275.	  	   Id.	  	  	   276.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   277.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  848;	  see	  also,	  Keeling,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1	  (indicating	  that	  New	  Mexico	  likely	  follows	  the	  at	  
21
Silvia: Slouching Toward Babel: Oklahoma's First Marketable Product Probl
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
604	   TULSA	  LAW	  REVIEW	   [Vol.	  49:583	  
4. North Dakota 
In July 2009, the Supreme Court of North Dakota ruled on Bice v. Petro-Hunt, 
L.L.C.,278 where it addressed a claim by a class of plaintiffs that the defendant inappro-
priately deducted post-production costs from royalty payments.279 The plaintiffs request-
ed that the state supreme court reverse the district court’s ruling, that North Dakota al-
lows for deduction of post-production costs in leases setting the valuation point at the 
well and to instead adopt the first marketable product approach.280 The plaintiffs, in part, 
based their argument on the existence of an ambiguity in the lease language “market val-
ue at the well.”281 In rejecting their argument, the court found that the marketable product 
approach is problematic, particularly with respect to the achievement of a marketable 
product.282 The court noted that “‘even the states which follow the . . . ‘marketable prod-
uct’ rule have failed to articulate a clear standard for determining when a marketable 
product has been created.’”283 The court expressly rejected the first marketable product 
approach and aligned itself with the majority view finding no ambiguity in the “market 
value at the well” lease language.284 
In what has been called a “significant victory,”285 the Bice ruling provides lessees 
with peace of mind that reasonably deducting post-production costs from at the well or 
similar leases in North Dakota will not result in a storm of litigation.286 Much like the 
states that have adopted the marketable product approach, the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota could have instead discarded the plain meaning of the leases under review and 
imposed the implied duty to market, thus forcing lessees to incur costs beyond produc-
tion.287 However, the court’s steadfast rejection of the approach emphasizes that the in-
herent flaws and unworkability of the marketable product approach create discomfort 
with some courts faced with adopting it.288 
B. What Should these Trends Mean for Oklahoma? 
As the above cases demonstrate, courts ruling on the deduction of post-production 
costs appear to experience some discomfort with the prospect of adopting the tenets of 
the marketable product approach, or at the least expanding the traditional meaning of in-
dustry terminology.289 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma should equally feel the same 
discomfort, and yet based on its rulings, it has no qualms with implementing an unwieldy 
                                                                                                                    the	  well	  approach).	  	  	   278.	  	   Bice	  v.	  Petro-­‐Hunt,	  L.L.C.,	  768	  N.W.2d	  496	  (N.D.	  2009).	  	  	   279.	  	   Id.	  at	  499.	  	   280.	  	   Id.	  at	  500.	  	  	   281.	  	   Id.	  	  	   282.	  	   Id.	  at	  502.	  	   283.	  	   Bice,	  768	  N.W.2d	  at	  502	  	  	   284.	  	   Id.	  	  	   285.	  	   With	  Oklahoma	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  its	  sister	  states	  committing	  to	  the	  first	  marketable	  product	  doc-­‐trine,	  the	  ruling	  in	  Bice	  gives	  cause	  for	  celebration	  by	  lessees	  pursuing	  oil	  and	  gas	  interests	  in	  the	  state.	  
See	   Lamont	   Larson,	  Royalty	   Alert—North	   Dakota	   Upholds	   the	   Deduction	   of	   Post-­‐Production	   Costs,	   DGS	  LAW	  (July	  17,	  2009),	  http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/OG_Alert_071709.html.	  	   286.	  	   See	  Bice,	  768	  N.W.2d	  at	  502.	  	   287.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  501-­‐03.	  	  	   288.	  	   See	  id.	  	   289.	  	   See	  supra	  Part	  VI.A.	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doctrine that creates more questions than solutions and opens the floodgates for litiga-
tion.290 If the rulings in these states are any indication of a growing unpopularity with the 
first marketable product approach, then the Supreme Court of Oklahoma should reevalu-
ate its adoption.291 Although the court is certainly not bound to the rulings of other juris-
dictions, nor under any obligation to give credence to their rulings, at the least it should 
contemplate the concerns of the courts seated in these states.292 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma should reconsider the problems that the first 
marketable product doctrine poses for the oil and gas industry in the state.293 In addition 
to flying in the face of tradition and history, the doctrine creates innumerable lease inter-
pretation problems, disregards fundamental contract principles, illogically expands the 
implied covenant to market, and produces unnecessary litigation risks.294 Discarding the 
first marketable product doctrine and implementing the at the well approach would re-
turn Oklahoma to a standard that gives credence to the language of leases and, absent 
any express provisions, allows for a more evenhanded and fair allocation of post-
production costs.295 There is no question that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma takes issue 
with the at the well approach, and perhaps there are elements that the court can tweak to 
quell its concerns.296 However, as the first marketable product doctrine does, such 
changes cannot so fundamentally alter the traditional meaning of legal principles that it 
renders them unworkable, causing more of a problem than a solution.297 Further, recent 
court rulings in other states indicating discomfort with the first marketable product ap-
proach should give cause to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to reexamine its adop-
tion.298 Consequently, it is in the best interests of the state and the oil and gas industry 
that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma abandon the first marketable product doctrine. 
 
William T. Silvia *	  
                                                	   290.	  	   See	  generally	  Mittelstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203,	  1210	  (Okla.	  1998)	  (where	  the	  court	   reaffirmed	   its	   commitment	   to	   the	   first	  marketable	  product	   approach);	   see	  also	  Lansdown,	   supra	  note	  1,	  at	  701-­‐03.	  	   291.	  	   For	  reasons	  indicating	  oil	  and	  gas	  bearing	  states	  might	  be	  trending	  away	  from	  the	  first	  marketa-­‐ble	  product	  doctrine	  and	  instead	  maintaining	  the	  at	  the	  well	  approach,	  see	  supra	  Part	  VI.A.	  	   292.	  	   For	  specific	  concerns	  contemplated	  by	  other	  jurisdictions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  these	  issues,	  see	  supra	  Part	  VI.A.	  	  	   293.	  	   See	  supra	  Part	  V.B.	  	   294.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Keeling	  &	  Gillespie,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  85;	  Lansdown,	  supra	  note	  211,	  at	  335;	  Lansdown,	  
supra	  note	  1,	  at	  701-­‐03;	  see	  generally	  Wheeler,	  supra	  note	  174.	  	   295.	  	   See	  generally	  Pierce,	  supra	  note	  2	  (discussing	  that	   lessees	  involved	  in	   litigation	  often	  attempt	  to	  convince	  courts	  to	  follow	  the	  Texas	  at	  the	  well	  view,	  while	  lessors	  generally	  attempt	  to	  argue	  use	  of	  the	  Colorado	  first	  marketable	  product	  view).	  	  	  	   296.	  	   See	  Mittelstaedt	  v.	  Santa	  Fe	  Minerals,	  Inc.,	  954	  P.2d	  1203	  (Okla.	  1998);	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.	  v.	  State	  ex	  
rel.	  Comm’rs	  of	  Land	  Office,	  903	  P.2d	  259	  (Okla.	  1994);	  Wood	  v.	  TXO	  Prod.	  Corp.,	  854	  P.2d	  880	  (Okla.	  1992).	  	   297.	  	   See	   supra	  Part	  V.B	   for	  a	  more	   in-­‐depth	  discussion	  on	   the	  unworkability	  and	  problems	  with	   the	  first	  marketable	  product	  doctrine.	  	   298.	  	   For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  recent	  rulings	  as	  well	  as	  an	  elaboration	  of	  the	  discomfort	  that	  the	  first	  marketable	  product	  doctrine	  has	  produced	  with	  reviewing	  courts,	  see	  supra	  Part	  VI.B.	  *	  I	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  to	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